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In this note I wish to argue that the distribution of production in two 
West African societies is related to the structure of economic units 
often referred to inexactly as 'households'. In so doing, I give support 
to the view of rural differentiation which gives attention to both 
external and internal factors.' 
The argument is based on research carried out between 1967 and 
198 1 among the Serer of the MBayar region of central Senegal, and 
among the Agni of the Moronu region in south-east Ivory Coast.* 
The kinship structure is similar in the two societies: the Serer reckon 
kinship bilaterally but with a matrilineal emphasis, and the Agni 
reckon kinship matrilineally. Distribution, however, differs markedly 
between the two cases. Individuals' economic opportunities within 
wider kin groups tend to be equalized among the Serer, while marked 
economic differentiation occurs between large- and small-scale Agni 
farmers. Distribution at the point of inheritance - i.e. over the life 
cycle - seems more critical to this process than the annual 
distribution after the harvest. A comparative exploration of the two 
cases demands attention to the particular way in which economic 
groups at the base are articulated with one another. 
It might be argued that the differences can be accounted for in 
terms of the economy's productive base. The MBayar region is in the 
savanna where annual crops (millet and peanuts) are produced on 
sandy soil; the Moronu region is in a luxuriant forest area where 
perennial crops (cocoa and coffee) and food crops (such as yam, 
banana, taro) are cultivated. While these differences in the productive 
base may be important, they must be looked at within a sociological 
context in order to reveal the means by which productive economies 
and domestic structures interact to generate patterns of differentiation. 
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THE COMBINATION OF ECONOMIC GROUPS 
Beginning with household structures in each society, one can work 
towards a definition of the groups which provides the framework for 
economic organization. In this study, only the working population 
(individuals engaged in the production process) has been taken into 
account. 
Observation reveals great diversity in the composition of the 
household in each society, ranging from single individuals to complex 
groups. Analysis of kinship categories and of generation, however, 
reveals a systematic pattern of differences between the two cases. In 
the MBayar region the household encompasses three generations, 
whereas in the Moronu region only two generations are included. In 
the MBayar region it includes more uterine relatives of the household 
head, in particular his brothers. In the Moronu region the household 
head is generally the only male household member of his generation. 
Economic individualism is more pronounced in Moronu than in 
MBayar. 
These differences in household membership are consonant with 
differences in the organization of groups involved in production, 
consumption and investment. In the MBayar region, such groups 
have different, overlapping memberships, whereas in Moronu, 
economic groups are superimposed on one another. 
I 
1 
The Dissociation of Economic Groups: 
The Serer of MBayar 
In the MBayar region, the production group and the ‘household’ 
have the same membership. The consumption group differs only in 
that its membership includes non-workers: the very young, invalids 
and the elderly. The accumulation group, by contrast, is made up of a 
nonlocalized group of uterine kin who trace common ancestry 
through four generations. The term ‘a ndok ya’ designates what I 
have called an accumulation group and means literally ‘a mother’s 
house’ (or cabin). It can refer to several different levels of inclusion, 
the lowest of which is a set of close matrilineal kin within the 
household, such as groups formed of a man and his brothers, a 
woman and her children, and, more rarely, a man with his sister’s 
daughter and the latter’s own children. A matrilineage comprises 
several accumulation groups and traces common ancestry back as 
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far as ten generations beyond the living elders. A production- 
consumption group is therefore organized into as many ‘accumulation 
subgroups’ as there are different matrilineal segments represented. 
These kin, both male and female, pool the surplus of their economic 
activities after their individual and household needs have been 
satisfied. 
Serer economic organization is therefore based on an ‘institu- 
tionalized contradiction’: all individuals belong at the same time to a 
production-consumption group and an accumulation group. They 
are therefore confronted by two sets of obligations: the activities of 
production and consumption on the one hand, and accumulation on 
the other. In order to reduce conflicts, a person will try to match what 
is given through labour to one group ‘with what is supplied in 
accumulated property to the other. 
As a result of a person’s obligation to satisfy the requirements of 
collective consumption and collective accumulation at the same time, 
the fraction of goods at his/her disposal for personal needs is limited 
and individual accumulation is kept to a low level. The head of the 
production-consumption group cannot take control of the surplus 
produced by the members because each individual turns it over to 
hidher accumulation group. These mechanisms, in my opinion, lead 
to a relative equalization of distribution and hence dampen processes 
of differentiation. This ‘egalitarian rationality’ is reinforced by a 
norm: accumulated property must never serve individual purposes. 
Economic differentiation reappears at a different level, however, 
between accumulation groups and hence between matrilineages. 
The heritable estate is made up of two categories of propeTty. 
Property of little value (work tools, kitchen utensils, etc.) is trans- 
mitted from father to son and from mother to daughter. Highly 
valued property (livestock, mechanical equipment and jewellery) is 
inherited through uterine relatives, first between full or uterine 
brothers, then by nephews. This property makes up a lineal 
accumulation, or ‘treasure’ - ‘halal’ in the Serer language - made up 
of livestock, mechanical equipment and jewellery. Individual 
members contribute to the accumulation of treasure during their 
entire life. The treasure can be considered, first, as productive capital, 
with the exception of the jewellery. Secondly, it can be used as an 
insurance fund in times of need. Thirdly, and most importantly, it 
serves as a reserve to be drawn on for celebrating the ceremonies 
which are landmarks in the life of an individual: name-giving, 
circumcision, marriage and the funeral. 
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In summary, the dissociation of economic groups contributes to an 
equalization of economic conditions at the individual level. It hinders 
the formation of individual productive accumulation, but it cannot 
prevent differentiation from reappearing between accumulation 
groups or between matrilineages. The latter groups differ among 
themselves in number of participants, diversity of sources of income 
and the variable fecundity of the women. This differentiation is 
expressed much more in terms of ‘collective power’ than in individual 
wealth. 
The Superimposition of Economic Groups among the 
Agni of the Moronu Region 
In the Moronu region, the production group consists of a domestic 
unit, resident in the village, and a unit made up of foreigners 
established in camp settlements in the fields. The first unit is the Agni 
household, while the second is made up of unskilled farm-workers, in 
large majority natives of Burkina Faso who work as share-croppers, 
earning a third of the harvest (‘abusan’). As with the Serer, the 
consumption group is the same as the production group, with the 
addition of non-working members: the old, invalids and children 
from the Agni domestic unit and children from the foreigners’ unit. 
The accumulation group is identical in all respects to the production 
group. Its most striking characteristic, in contrast to the Serer case, is 
that the farmer is often the only man of his generation and lineage 
membership. He is, therefore, the only one in a position to mobilize 
the labour force of the production group for accumulation purposes, 
and to appropriate the surplus of the accumulation group. 
The production, consumption and accumulation groups are, 
therefore, empirically the same, and have been conceptually distin- 
guished only for the purposes of analysis. The farmer’s privileged 
position of control in all three types of group means that calculation 
of production, consumption and investment is done within a single 
unit, which in turn allows for the possibility of individual accumu- 
lation by its head. 
Individual accumulation sets up a heritable estate which is made up 
of several categories of property: the farmlands, income on property 
and a treasury of liquid assets. This inheritance is transmitted 
through uterine relatives, first among full or uterine brothers, then 
among the children of their sisters. Gifts may also be granted among 
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the living, making it possible for the farmer to deduct some property 
from the lineal succession. The estate also supports the wives and 
children of the deceased; the moral obligations of a man to the 
members of the domestic unit are to be sustained by his heir. 
Among the forms of accumulated property, the treasury seems to 
be particularly significant, since it reveals one of the incentives to 
economic activity. During the pre-colonial period the treasury was 
held in security by the lineage head and served as a security fund in 
fragile and autarchic economies, in order to face exceptional 
circumstances such as debts, fines and funerals. It served to protect 
and enlarge the lineage by making it possible to repurchase captured 
women or to purchase women to hold as captives (see Perrot, 1978, 
1982). 
At the present time, the biggest farmers use the accumulated assets 
of their treasuries in a competitive effort to establish themselves as 
founders of descent units which will be pre-eminent among local 
lineages. The conditions in the contemporary economy intersect with, 
and amplify the effects of, the older pattern of treasury accumulation. 
We have seen that the Serer and the Agni contrast with one 
another, yet the basic principles of kinship structure are matrilineal in 
both cases. An interpretation of the economic process in the two cases 
therefore depends on analysis of the different structures of ‘house- 
hold’ enterprise. 
. 
I 
AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ECONOMIC PROCESS 
The preceding section deals with the internal make-up of economic 
groups. It is now necessary,to consider the history of these two 
societies before attempting an overall interpretation. 
I 
Ecology, Economy, History 
One can posit a set of interactions among the ecological niche, the 
economic system and outside interventions. The ecological niche 
conditioned the kind of external interventions attendant on colonial 
rule, which in turn shaped the economic system. The development of 
economic organization was conditioned by these economic structures. 
The MBayar region is characterized by savanna and low rainfall, 
and the production process is based on annual crops. Every year, the 
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cultivated fields worked by the production group are cleared at 
harvest time. Thus the work effort, as manifest in the fields, does not 
accumulate from one year to another. Under these conditions, the 
colonial administration had very little interest in reorganizing 
production, since there was little potential for cumulative effect. 
During the period from 1910 to 1950, the administration intervened 
very little in the economic, administrative or religious life of 
M B a ~ a r . ~  From Independence in 1960, however, the government 
tried to modify the organization of production and trade, but the 
international economic situation meant that price conditions for the 
main crop, peanuts, did not offer sufficient incentives to the 
producers. As a result, rural transformation was very limited, in spite 
of changes in the availability of health services and shifts in 
demography. 
In contrast, the Moronu region is situatedin a forest zone with high 
rainfall and is suitable for the cultivation of perennial crops. A year’s 
labour produces a harvested crop and preserves past investment; 
hence production leads to cumulative results. The colonial adminis- 
tration intervened in Moronu to coerce labour to a degree never 
attempted in MBayar: first because a potential existed for cumulative 
effect on the structure of the rural labour force; and secondly, because 
the population density was low enough to make the regional labour- 
supply problem difficult to deal From 1909 to 1931 a policy of 
forced labour was directed at the local population. From 1932 
onwards migrations were organized from Upper Volta towards the 
southern Ivory Coast, and these continue to the present time. The 
addition of the foreign labour unit to the domestic unit compensated 
for the loss of captive and other forced labour. The government’s 
actions therefore intervened in crucial ways to support the acquisition 
of individual wealth, which was taking place on the basis of social and 
cultural patterns brought forward from the pre-colonial era. 
In both cases, the links between the local and the wider economy 
reinforced certain aspects of indigenous strúcture. The present 
economic processes in the two regions are a function of the dynamic 
between internal forms of organization and external forces. 
Wealth, Power and Glory 
A longer-term collective logic underlies the contrasts in short-run 
economic choices in the two systems, and the differences in the 
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economic life cycles of individuals. Accumulated assets are not used 
to reproduce the means of production, but rather to build a heritable 
estate. The heir is only an administrator in the name of the collectivity 
of Co-heirs; his personal desires cannot hold sway, and he cannot 
divert the wealth from activities that benefit the community of co- 
heirs. Norms reinforce the eventual collectivization of highly valued 
property, and sanctions are stiff: rejection from village life in the 
MBayar region, and sorcery and poisoning in the Moronu region. 
In the past, such accumulation sought to realize the demographic 
potential of the community. Among the Serer, cattle were used to 
acquire women; in fact, cattle are still an important component of 
bridewealth. Among the Agni, hoards of gold dust made it possible 
for men to buy back women from captivity or to acquire their own 
captives. In both cases the emphasis was on the acquisition of women 
to ensure the perpetuity of the group of accumulators. During a 
period when population density was low, when economic groups 
were small, and the environment was threatening, only collective 
institutions of defence were effective against natural dangers such as 
famine, or human dangers such as abduction of women and livestock. 
Currently, the economic process in both societies can be interpreted 
as follows: wealth, whether achieved initially through individual 
accumulation as in the Agni case, or through pooling, as in the Serer 
case, ultimately results in collective accumulation which preserves the 
‘power’ of the community of Co-heirs. In the long run, competition 
and differentiation take place between matrilineages rather than 
individuals, and can be better represented in terms of ‘power’ - 
including demographic strength and symbolic power - than in terms 
of ‘wealth’. The economic egalitarianism of the Serer of the MBayar 
region and the acquisitive individualism of the large farmers of the 
Moronu region are not ends in themselves but means of protecting 
and enlarging matrilineages. 
It is perhaps surprising that social mechanisms still exist, albeit in a 
modified form. Mechanical equipment has been integrated into the 
lineal estate in the MBayar region, and gold dust has long since 
disappeared from the Moronu region. But large-scale productive 
accumulation in the modern sector is still out of reach for most 
African village farmers who persistently follow paths of distribution 
and accumulation inherited from the past. 
This is not to claim that such paths have been immune to 
government or urban influence. They have been shaped by these 
influences over the century, and at present their efficacy and even 
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existence may be vulnerable. Government regulation of local institu- 
tions - for example, the vigorous introduction of the property and 
inheritance clauses of the French Civil Code - could destroy the 
capacity of matrilineages to adapt in a collective fashion. But the 
indigenous institutions have so far been resilient in the face of recent 
adverse ecological and economic conditions; adaptation to changing 
circumstances has not so far been vitiated by the fact that the ultimate 
purpose or end of accumulation is not expanded reproduction of the 
means of production, but rather social power, collectively expressed. 
One major implication of this analysis for development project 
planning is that the analytical contrast between individualism and 
collectivism is not a useful one. In each case the process of 
production, consumption and investment contains individual and 
collective moments, individual and collective logics. The two cases 
differ in the specific points at which the individual is relevant actor, 
and those at which the collectivity is the relevant actor. Production 
projects based on one form or another of indigenous kinship 
organization must envisage both individual and collective phases in 
the cycle of production, consumption and investment. 
APPENDIX 
Distribution of the Family Units According to Their Male and Female 
Composition 
1. Ngohé-MBayar in 1970 
No women 
1 woman 
2 women 
3 women 
4 women 
5 women 
More 
TOTAL 
NoMen l M a n  
- 12 
19 73 
4 41 
- 16 
- 3 
- - 
23 145 
2Men 3 Men 4Men 5 Men 
33 I 2 2 
27 14 11 1 
21 10 3 1 
5 12 2 1 
2 1 - 2 
1 1 2 - 
91 45 20 7 
2 - - - More TOTAL - 14 
- 136 
- 98 
- 51 
- 23 
- 5 
- 4 
- 331 
? 
I, -+ J% 
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2. Moronu in 1976-7 
NoMen lMan  2Men 3Men 4Men 5Men More TOTAL 
No women 
1 woman 
2 women 
3 women 
4 women 
5 women 
More 
TOTAL 
3 
33 
32 
19 
10 
16 
7 
120 
- - 1 -  
3 3 3 1  
13 4 -  1 
11 1 2 
5 2 1 -  
9 '  5 3 3  
45 18 10 7 
- 
4 3 2 . -  
NOTES 
23 
111 
109 
66 
42 
31 
40 
422 
I. This article develops ideas first explored in Gastellu (1980). The present text has 
benefited from the observations of Sara Berry, Jane Guyer and Pauline Peters. It is 
published in French under the title 'Petit traité de matrilinarité. L'accumulation dans 
deux sociétés rurales d'Afrique de l'Ouest', Cahiers ORSTOM, série Sciences Humaines 
4 (1985). 
2. The Serer occupy the savanna zone of central Senegal. Rainfall is 600-800" 
per year. The major crops are millet and sorghum for food and peanuts as an export 
crop. The site of research, MBayar, is in the north-east Serer area, close to Diourbel. 
Field-work was carried out between March 1967 and August 1972. The Agni occupy 
the high rainfall forest zone of the south-east Ivory Coast. Crops are diversified. They 
include yams, plantain, taro and cassava for food, and cocoa and coffee as export 
crops. Moronu is in the west of the Agni zone. Field-work was carried out between 
March 1976 and August 1981. 
3. The samples were from: an exhaustive study in the village of Ngohé, Senegal, in 
1970, comprising a total of 1,001 members of the working population; and a 
combination of samplings in the Moronu region, in 1976-7, comprisinga total of 1,897 
members of the working population. The Appendix summarizes household com- 
position in the two areas. 
4. Sources on Serer history include Martin (1867), Vuillot (1898), Peter (1933) and 
Pélissier (1966). 
5. Sources on Agni history include Kwame Aka (1979), Ekanza (1983) and Dittgen 
et al. (1978). 
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